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We investigate the relevance of the characteristics of Ministers of Finance as an influence on 
the development of stock returns, sovereign yields and fiscal outcomes, which result from the 
implementation of their fiscal policies. For a panel of 27 EU countries, covering the period of 
1980-2012, we find that academic background, tenure and gender, play a role in determining 
stock and bond market returns, as well as the general fiscal position of governments.  
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The 2010-2012 European Union (EU) debt crisis, which followed the 2008-2009 
economic and financial crisis, is an important constraint for the implementation of economic 
policy, notably in the EU. Alongside such constraints, one also needs to take into account the 
characteristics of policy makers, notably their background, to understand to what extent they 
play a role in steering policy and in taking the most adequate decisions. 
Economic, institutional and supra-individual features are usually the relevant 
determinants of capital markets and fiscal outcomes.  Governments are responsible for the 
implementation of economic policy, notably at macro level, and therefore the behaviour of 
governments may play a role as a potential determinant of both capital markets and fiscal 
outcomes. Moreover, as Ministers of Finance are major key players in the implementation of 
fiscal and macroeconomic policies, their personal characteristics are quite relevant to this 
question, especially with regard to their academic and professional background.   
So far, the literature has focussed on the role of political parties and, in particularly, the 
Head of the Party and their choices (Jones and Olken, 2005). However, little has been written 
about the role of those who are responsible for financial issues. Finance Ministers play an 
important role in determining public deficit (Jochimsen and Thomasius, 2012), public debt 
(Moessinger, 2013) and the setting of fiscal agendas (von Hagen et al., 2001). In fact, one 
question remains under-researched, which is how to assess whether the individual 
characteristics of Finance Ministers has an effect on the development of capital markets and 
fiscal variables. 
Some of the literature advocates that individuals do play an important role in acting as 
policy makers. Hence, individual characteristics such as age, gender and political ideology, 
among others, shape their choices and may influence decisions made in relation to capital 
markets and fiscal results, such as debt-to-GDP ratio, or even long-term government bond 
yields.  
We add to the literature by assessing the relevance of the characteristics of Ministers of 
Finance in determining the above-mentioned outcomes, for a panel of EU countries, covering 
the period of 1980-2012. After controlling for several relevant economic variables, our results 
show that academic background, tenure and gender, play a role in determining stock and bond 




The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature; Section 3 
explains the setting up of the dataset; Section 4 reports the empirical analysis and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
The personal characteristics of Finance Ministers 
The literature examines the factors that influence budget deficits or government debt by 
considering several aspects. On one hand, fiscal outcomes are associated with procedural 
rights (Hagen and Harden, 1995; Hallerberg and Nuscheler, 2011), and the relationship 
between fiscal outcomes and Finance Ministers is examined (Jochimsen and Nuscheler, 2011). 
On the other hand, other studies assess the influence of the number of parties or ministers in a 
government (Haan et al., 1999, Volkerink and de Haan, 2001 and Perotti and Kontopoulos, 
2002), as well as the amount of time a government remains in office (Haan et al., 1999). These 
latter studies also analyse ideological affiliation and the degree of ideological polarisation 
(Volkerink and de Haan, 2001), plus behaviour experienced prior to elections (Brender and 
Drazen, 2005).  
However, the literature has neglected the role of Finance Ministers and centres attention 
on Heads of Government (e.g. Dreher et al., 2009; Somogyi, 2010, and Congleton and Zhang, 
2009 for US Presidents), or institutions (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). In 
addition, business/management literature has focussed more on the relationship between 
CEOs’ personal characteristics, as they act as the leader and decision maker, as well as the 
performance of companies (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Nelson, 2005; Bhagat, Boltom and 
Subramanian, 2010). Moreover, very little literature is available that explores the personal 
characteristics of Finance Ministers and their relationship to performance and fiscal outcomes.  
Gender 
Gender has been pointed out as being one of the important characteristic in terms of 
attitudes towards spending. The literature explains that women and men do not show the same 
attitude towards spending, with women usually preferring greater public spending (Edlund and 
Pande, 2002, Baltrunaite, et al., 2012). In particular, women seem to give priority to spending 
public money on welfare (e.g. Bertocchi, 2011; Rehavi, 2007), for example, Svaleryd (2009) 




areas such as childcare, education and care for the elderly. In another context, Muravyev et al. 
(2013) report that female-managed firms are less likely to obtain a bank loan. 
Furthermore, there is also some evidence that women channel more public funds to 
projects related to women’s needs. For example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show that 
women leaders spend more on the needs of rural Indian women, such as water and road 
projects, whilst Clots-Figueras (2011) report evidence that Indian woman leaders invest more 
in health and early education. There is also evidence pointing to a higher reduction of inflation 
when women are present in government (Farvaque, Hammadou and Stanek, 2009, 2011). In a 
study that covers Ministers of Finance in former West Germany over the period of 1960-2009, 
Jochimsen and Thomasius (2012) found that the gender of the Minister of Finance does not 
play any role in influencing the outcome of budget deficits. 
Age 
Age is a personal characteristic that is likely to affect work attitudes and behaviour 
(Taylor, 1975; Rhodes, 1983). In the particular case of the chronologically ordered age of 
Finance Ministers, there is little empirical evidence that it affects the performance of budget 
deficits. The notable exceptions are the studies of Besley and Case (1995), and Jochimsen and 
Thomasius (2012). The results of the former study show that Finance Ministers approaching 
retirement age tend to be associated with greater budget deficits. However, the latter study 
does not confirm this finding and shows that age has no influence on budget deficits. 
Academic background 
Another documented personal characteristic that contributes to deficit policy is academic 
background. Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2011) advocate that more educated leaders 
have more ability to act in the public interests. However, they fail to demonstrate the impact of 
higher education on performance. Political leaders with an economic or legal background are 
linked to higher budget deficits (Mikosch and Somogyi, 2009). However, once more, the 
specific link between the education background of Finance Ministers and fiscal outcomes has 
yet to be explored. A noteworthy exception is Jochimsen and Thomasius (2012) and 
Moessinger (2013), who show that education does not seem to have an influence when it 
comes to budget deficits. However, the same authors argue that the prior experience of 
Finance Ministers is more likely to affect budget deficits. Moessinger (2013) mentions that 




government debt and are alleged to be responsible for greater fiscal discipline and that left-
wing governments are less fiscally disciplined when they are led by former students of 
Economics. 
Tenure 
The literature also addresses the relevance of the length of years in the position of 
Finance Ministers in relation to public spending preferences. The evidence suggests that 
Finance Ministers with more time in the position tend to exhibit more stability and discipline 
and, hence, they are associated with lower deficits (Feld and Schaltegger, 2012; Jochimsen 
and Thomasius, 2012; Moessinger, 2013). 
Political characteristics 
The political ideology of political leaders, with Finance Ministers in particular, may have 
an impact on fiscal policies. However, the literature is not consensual. Some authors favour 
the argument that left-wing ideologies are usually concerned with the redistribution of wealth 
and welfare, and are thus associated with greater spending and higher deficits. Golden and 
Poterba (1980) supported this argument empirically for the US, as well as Roubini and Sachs 
(1989) for the OECD, and Baskaran (2012) for Germany; all of whom report results showing 
that left-wingers are bigger spenders when compared to right-wing and mixed-ideology 
governments. However, other authors claim that ideology has no impact on the development 
of public finance (e.g. de Haan and Sturm, 1994, 1997; Tavares, 2004 and Moessinger, 2013). 
 
3. Data and stylized facts 
 In Table 1 we report some descriptive statistics regarding the data set that we 
compiled. We use an unbalanced panel data for the period 1980-2012, covering 27 EU 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom. 
As one can see from Table 1, both left and right wing parties have a similar presence in 




Overall, the average age of Finance Ministers was nearly 51 years old and they do not 
tend to stay long in that position, the average tenure being about 2 years. Overall, we can see 
that during that period, only 4% of Finance Ministers were women. 
[Table 1] 
 For our data set we collected information regarding the academic background of 
Finance Ministers (or Ministers of Economics, depending on who is in charge of fiscal policy 
in each country) for the 27 countries throughout the period. We coded the academic 
background of ministers as follows: Economics, Law, Management, Finance/Accounting, 
Other Social Sciences, “Hard sciences” and “No formal Tertiary Education”. We then coded 
the respective categories as dummy variables for the purpose of formal estimation. As one can 
see from Table 2, the most frequent background for Ministers of Finance is Economics 
(41.2%), Law (21.8%), and Finance/Accounting (10.1%). 
[Table 2] 
 
4. Empirical analysis  
The baseline specification for the return in the capital markets, R, is given by: 
 
 1 1 1 2 3 4 1it i it it it it it itR c R y debt U X                (1) 
 
where the index i denotes the country, the index t indicates the period, ci stands for the 
individual effects to be estimated for each country i. In addition we consider: y – 10-year 
sovereign bond yield; debt – debt ratio; U – unemployment rate;  – inflation rate; X – 
includes a set of variables describing several characteristics of Minister of Finances (for 
instance, female or male, age, tenure, area of academic degree). 
Regarding the baseline specification for the 10-year sovereign yield, y, we used: 
 
 1 1 1 2 3 4 1 1it i it it it it it it ity c y R debt U X Z                  (2) 
 
where Z includes a set of variables describing several aspects related to political developments 




in Parliament). In addition, in (2), the change in debt ratio also alternates with the budget 
balance ratio, in order to complement the assessment of the impact of fiscal stance on long-
term sovereign bond yields. 
Finally, in the third baseline, we directly check for the determinants of fiscal stance, 
which is measured by budget balance, as fiscal policy is mainly under the control of the 
Minister of Finance: 
 
 1 1 1 2 1 3 4 1 1it i it it it it it it itbudbal c y R debt U X Z                 . (3) 
 
4.1. Capital markets outcomes 
 The estimation results for specification (1) regarding yearly stock market returns are 
reported in Table 3. Accordingly, we can see that higher levels of sovereign debt and inflation 
have a positive effect on stock market returns, whilst an increase in the rate of unemployment 
reduces those market returns. Regarding the various characteristics of Ministers of Finance, 
we can find that if they have a degree (“Degree 5” dummy) in “Other Social Sciences” (but 
not in Economics, Law, Management, Finance, or Accounting), this has a positive effect on 
stock market returns in our panel analysis. Nevertheless, with robust standard errors, these 
results are less significant. 
[Table 3] 
 In terms of the results of 10-year sovereign bond yields (specification (2)), in Table 4, 
we can observe upward effects resulting from the change in debt ratio and inflation. In 
addition, the pressure of unemployment on sovereign bond yields may stem from the fact that 
a higher fiscal spending in unemployment benefits implies an additional need for governments 
to raise financing in capital markets. This, therefore, necessarily implies higher budget 
deficits, which is a similar conclusion to that of the positive effect of higher debt ratios on 
yields. Interestingly, stock returns also have a positively impact on bond returns, whilst the 
reverse effect was not present in the specification for stock market returns in Table 2 above.  
 Regarding the characteristics of Ministers of Finance, we see that if the minister is a 
woman, then this has a statistical significant effect on the reduction of 10-year sovereign 




one case where if the Minister of Finance has a background in Management (dummy coded as 
“Degree 3”), this increase 10-year sovereign bond yield. 
[Table 4] 
 
4.2. Fiscal outcomes 
 Table 5 reports the estimation results for specification (3), regarding the possible 
determinants of budget balance. Interestingly, we uncover a Ricardian behaviour in the panel, 
given that budget balance improves when there is an increase in the debt ratio of the previous 
period. Again, the effect of unemployment shows up in statistical terms, with higher 
unemployment rates translating into a worsening of the fiscal position, 
 The fact that the Minister of Finance is a woman plays a statistically significant role 
again, but in this case, by worsening the fiscal position. On the other hand, tenure improves 
budget balance, with an improvement of budget balance by around 0.14 pp of GDP for each 
year that the Finance Minister was in charge.  
Additionally, when considered separately from tenure, academic background of 
Finance Ministers also plays a role. Indeed, having no formal education or possessing an 
academic background in Economics, Law or Finance/Accounting (respectively Degree 0, 1, 2, 
and 4), contributes to an improvement in budget balance position in a statistically significant 




We investigate the relevance of the characteristics of Ministers of Finance as an 
influence on the development of capital markets, stock returns, yields and fiscal outcomes for 
a panel of 27 EU countries, covering the period of 1980-2012.  
The results of our empirical analysis can be summarised as follows: a degree in “Other 
Social Sciences” (not Economics, Law, Management, Finance, or Accounting) has a positive 
effect on stock market returns. A background in Management increases 10-year sovereign 
bond yield. Having no formal education or possessing an academic background in Economics, 




In addition, if the Minister is woman, this has a statistical significant effect in reducing 
10-year sovereign yield, but it also worsens the fiscal position. Moreover, the number of years 
Finance Ministers have consecutively been in charge improves budget balance.  
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Table A1 - Data descritpion and sources 
Variable Description Source 
General Data 
Inf Inflation rate IMF/WEO 
Bbal General government budget balance, as a percentage of 
GDP 
AMECO [and IMF/WEO] 
Capb Cyclically adjusted primary balance, as a percentage of 
GDP 
AMECO 
Debt Government debt stock, as a percentage of GDP AMECO 
Unemp Unemployment rate AMECO 
Yield Benchmark government bond yield Datastream [and AMECO] 
Stock Yearly rate of change of main national stock indices Datastream and Eurostat 
Left Political positioning of the largest party in government 
is Left-wing 
World Bank/DPI 
Right Political positioning of the largest party in government 
is Right-wing 
World Bank/DPI 
Center Political positioning of the largest party in government 
is Centre-wing 
World Bank/DPI 
Other Political positioning of the largest party in government 
is Other, or Not Defined. 
World Bank/DPI 
Finance Ministers’ Data 
Female Dummy variable, equal to 1 in years where the Finance 
Ministers is a woman, 0 otherwise 
Own 
Age Age of Finance Minister Own 
Tenure The number of years a Finance Minister has been 
consecutively in charge 
Own 
Degree1 Economics  
Degree2 Law Own 
Degree3 Management Own 
Degree 4 Finance/Accounting Own 
Degree 5 Other Social Sciences Own 
Degree 6 Hard Science Own  



















Table 1 – Data set 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Inf 734 7.76 21.76 -21.48 295.48 
Bbal 679    -3.32  4.18 -30.94 9.68   
Capb 676 0.39 3.38 -25.48 10.43 
Debt 709 53.34 29.92 3.69 170.55 
Unemp 732 8.27 4.14 0 25.00 
Yield 635 7.43 3.98 1.40 27.74 
Stock  593 1.94 15.93 -0.99 180.49 
Left 891 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Right 891 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Center 891 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Other 891 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Female 833 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Age 833 50.52 8.36 30 93 
Tenure 830 2.31 2.60 0 20 
Degree 0 834 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Degree1 834 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Degree2 834 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Degree3 834 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Degree 4 834 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Degree 5 834 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Degree 6 834 0.05 0.21 0 1 
 
Table 2 – Finance Ministers’ Academic Background 





Economics 336 1 41.2 
Law 178 2 28.1 
Management 58 3 7.1 
Finance/Accounting 87 4 10.7 
Other Social Sciences 66 5 8.1 
"Hard Sciences" 38 6 4.7 
No formal education 53 0 6.5 


















































































































Finance Ministers’ characteristics 
 












Age   -0.336 
(-0.64) 
   -0.336 
(-0.76) 
 
Tenure   -1.009 
(-0.68) 
   -1.009 
(-1.39) 
 
Degree 0    27.153 
(1.07) 
   27.153 
(1.27) 
Degree 1    7.554 
(0.39) 
   7.554 
(0.63) 
Degree 2    14.008 
(0.68) 
   14.008 
(0.86) 
Degree 3    -5.656 
(-0.25) 
   -5.656 
(-0.33) 
Degree 4    34.717 
(1.48) 
   34.717 
(1.61) 
Degree 5    47.586** 
(2.12) 
   47.586 
(1.01) 
Note: In Column 1 to 4, the models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE).  In Column 5 to 8, the models are estimated by Within Fixed 
Effects (FE) with robust errors. 









Table 4 – Results for 10-year Sovereign Yields 
Dependent Variable Yield 

























































































































Finance Ministers’ characteristics 
 
















Age   0.007 
(0.61) 
    0.007 
(0.79) 
  
Tenure   0.010 
(0.32) 
    0.010 
(0.43) 
  
Degree 0    0.362 
(0.70) 
    0.362 
(0.80) 
 
Degree 1    0.075 
(0.19) 
    0.075 
(0.29) 
 
Degree 2    0.412 
(0.98) 
    0.412 
(0.87) 
 
Degree 3    0.559 
(1.20) 
    0.559* 
(1.76) 
 
Degree 4    0.350 
(0.72) 
    0.350 
(0.80) 
 
Degree 5    0.274 
(0.59) 





Left-wing party     0.264 
(0.75) 
    0.264 
(1.38) 
Right-wing party     -0.124 
(-0.34) 
    -0.124 
(-0.68) 
Centre party     0.486 
(1.07) 
    0.486 
(1.24) 
Majority     1.641 
(1.57) 
    1.641 
(1.47)  
Number of seats     0.012** 
(2.14) 
    0.012*** 
(3.73) 
Note: In Column 1 to 5, the models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE).  In Column 6 to 10, the models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE) with robust errors. 




Table 5 – Results for Budget Balance 
Dependent Variable BBal 















































































Finance Ministers’ characteristics 
 
















Age   0.000 
(0.05) 
    0.000 
(0.03) 
  
Tenure   0.136** 
(2.47) 
    0.136* 
(1.92) 
  
Degree 0    1.830** 
(2.16) 
    1.830 
(1.48) 
 
Degree 1    1.845** 
(2.59) 
    1.845 
(1.53) 
 
Degree 2    1.673** 
(2.23) 
    1.673 
(1.23) 
 
Degree 3    1.292 
(1.55) 
    1.292 
(1.13) 
 
Degree 4    2.987*** 
(3.46) 
    2.987* 
(1.98) 
 
Degree 5    1.351 
(1.61) 
    1.351 
(1.03) 
 
Political developments  
 
Left-wing party     0.484 
(0.82) 
    0.484 
(0.42) 
Right-wing party     0.699 
(1.17) 
    0.699 
(0.66) 
Centre party     -1.057 
(-1.38) 
    -1.057 
(-0.92) 
Majority     0.528 
(0.31) 
    0.528 
(0.23) 
Number seats     -0.048*** 
(-5.23) 
    -0.048* 
(-1.76) 
Note: In Column 1 to 5, the models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE).  In Column 6 to 10, the models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE) with robust errors  
t values are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
